








Carbon Markets After Paris
How to Account for the Transfer
of Mitigation Results?





















The positions expressed in this paper are strictly those of the authors and represent 
neither the opinion of the Wuppertal Institute nor of the German Federal Ministry 
for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety.
The Wuppertal Institute is carrying out the “JIKO”-project on behalf of the German 







Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy  
Döppersberg 19 • 42103 Wuppertal • Germany 
www.wupperinst.org/en/
January 2016 










     

 
Carbon Markets after Paris 
How to Account for the Transfer 
of Mitigation Results? 














1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
 
2 Accounting Basics......................................................................................................... 2
 
2.2
 Kyoto Accounting............................................................................................................................................... 3
2.1 What is an GHG accounting framework?..................................................................................................... 2
 
2.2.1 The Definition of Kyoto Commitments: The Assigned Amount ...............................................3
 











3 Broad Variety of INDC Types ....................................................................................... 7
 
4 Accounting for unit transfer post-2020 ...................................................................... 8
 
4.1 
4.2 Double counting as a key risk associated with unit transfers .................................................................9
 
What kind of units might be traded and how could transfers look like post-2020? .......................... 8
 
4.3





Net Unit Flow Reporting....................................................................................................................... 10
 
4.3.3
 Accounting of Units Towards Mitigation Contributions........................................................... 11
 Reporting with Increased Ex-Ante Certainty................................................................................. 10
 
4.4 Diversity of INDCs and Participation in Unit Transfer ............................................................................ 11
 
4.4.1 Parties With Multi-Year Targets.......................................................................................................... 12
 
4.4.2 Parties With Single-Year Targets ....................................................................................................... 13
 
4.4.3 Parties With Non-GHG Contributions .............................................................................................. 16
 
4.4.4 Parties with Emission Intensity Targets........................................................................................... 17
 
4.4.5



























Nicolas Kreibich and Wolfgang Obergassel
Summary
The Paris Agreement adopted at COP 21 in De­
cember 2015 is going to shape international 
climate policy for the next decades. The 
Agreement differs in many ways from the Kyoto 
Protocol (KP): Under this new agreement “con­
tributions” will be adopted by all Parties, not
only by so called developed countries as under 
the KP. This global participation, however,
comes at the cost of increasing complexity: In­
stead of a uniform formula the Paris Agreement 
allows Parties to autonomously define their na­
tionally determined contributions (NDCs), re­
sulting in a large diversity with significant chal­
lenges for emissions accounting.
These challenges are further increased when 
Parties with different types of contributions 
participate in the transfer of emission units. Par­
ties with very different types of INDCs have ex­
pressed their willingness to do so, mainly under 
future market-based mechanisms. This raises 
the following questions: How should these 
transfers be accounted for and what require­
ments (opt-In provisions) should be established 
to allow Parties to participate in the transfer of 
emission units in order to ensure environmental
integrity? 
This paper analyses these questions by first 
looking at GHG accounting frameworks more 
generally, their functions and elements. The 
functioning of such a system is then illustrated
by presenting the provisions of the Kyoto Pro­
tocol’s accounting framework. From there, the 
authors briefly present the diversity of the 
INDCs that have been submitted so far. Based 
on the overview of INDCs, different types of 
contributions are analysed regarding their 
compatibility with unit transfer and potential 
risk to environmental integrity in form of dou­
ble counting. There are different forms of dou­
ble counting, two of which are particularly rele­
vant in the context of accounting:
•	 Double claiming: emission reduction is 
used for GHG pledge attainment by the 
exporting and by the importing Party;
•	 Double coverage: emission reduction 
is used to meet a GHG target in one 
country and a non-GHG contribution in
another.
The findings indicate that different types of 
contributions are associated with different lev­
els of risks for these forms of double counting:
Participation of Parties whose contribution is
expressed as a continuous multi-year GHG 
target is fairly straightforward since they are 
compatible with a carbon budget approach 
that can be used to directly account for the 
units transferred. Parties should however be re­
quired to fully account for net unit flows of 
units in order to reduce the risk of double 
claiming and increase ex-ante certainty. 
Participation of Parties with single-year tar­
gets, in contrast, is much more problematic:
Both the import (use) and the export of units 
could undermine the environmental integrity of 
the entire system. Hence, Parties with single­
year targets willing to fully participate in emis­
sions trading should be required to convert 
their contribution into a continuous multi-year 
target. Without such conversion, the export and 
particularly the use of units would need to be 
tied to very strict preconditions, significantly
limiting the practicability of these transfers. 
Contributions expressed in terms of non-GHG 
targets as well as multiple targets are associ­
ated with the risk of double coverage. While the 
import and use of emission units by Parties with 
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require a conversion of the carbon unit into the 
metric of the respective non-GHG target, the 
export of units could be envisaged by several 
countries. The risk of double coverage could be 
addressed by limiting the export of units to 
credits outside the scope of the contribution. If
units (credits or allowances) from within the 
scope of the contribution are also to be export­
ed, all units transferred should be fully account­
ed for the different types of non-GHG contribu­
tions. However, there might be types of non-
GHG contributions where this can be challeng­
ing.
Parties with multiple contributions that com­
bine a GHG target with non-GHG contribu­
tions could import GHG units and account
them for the GHG target. Exported units from 
within the scope of the contribution, however,
would have to be fully accounted against the 
GHG targets as well as non-GHG contributions 
concerned.
In general terms, contributions expressed as in­
tensity targets are less compatible with allow­
ance trading approaches. Since the allocation 
of allowances would depend on dynamic fac­
tors, projections on the evolution of these fac­
tors would be needed ex-ante while the actual 
amount of allowances would then have to be 
adjusted ex-post. Crediting of activities that 
contribute to emission reductions below the 
intensity target might be possible.
In addition to these opt-in provisions for Parties 
willing to participate in unit transfers and re­
gardless of the type of contribution in question,
the scope of the contribution must be properly 
defined. In addition, there are some general
possibilities to minimize, reduce or avoid
different forms of double counting: If the
primary goal is to ensure environmental integri­
ty ex-post, all Parties involved would at least 
have to report on net unit transfers. This option 
would, however, not address the risk of double 
claiming ex-ante. To avoid double claiming and 
increase ex-ante certainty, Parties should be re­
quired to fully account for exported units gen­
erated from mitigation activities inside the 
scope of their contribution. Transfers of units 
generated outside the scope of the contribu­
tions must be reported and should be subject 
to international oversight. More generally, in­
ternational oversight might be required for all
types of unit transfers if the additionality of the 
underlying mitigation activities is not ensured 
by sufficient ambition of Parties’ contributions.
Hence, ambitious mitigation contributions are 
not only pivotal for speeding up climate change 
action and reducing associated costs but they 
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1 Introduction
 
With the adoption of the Paris Agreement the 
global community breaks new ground in inter­
national climate policy: for the first time, all 
countries of the world are to undertake mitiga­
tion actions. This new paradigm will also fun­
damentally change the functioning of interna­
tional market mechanisms. 
The carbon market has so far been dominated 
by the Kyoto Protocol, which is essentially an 
international cap-and-trade system. Industrial­
ised countries adopt absolute economy-wide 
emission targets and are issued emission units 
accordingly. At the end of the commitment pe­
riod, they must present an internationally rec­
ognised emission unit for each tonne of GHGs 
they emitted. In the interim, they are able to 
trade emission units with each other. All trans­
fers are deducted from the selling country’s
pool of units and added to the buying country’s
pool, while the overall number of units stays 
the same (“capped environment”). Industrial­
ised countries may also source units from CDM
projects in developing countries. As developing 
countries do not have Kyoto commitments 
(“uncapped environment”), the emission credits 
issued to CDM projects effectively enlarge the 
pool of units available to industrialised coun­
tries. 
The Paris Agreement differs from the Kyoto Pro­
tocol in two fundamental ways. First, there will 
no longer be a clear distinction at national level 
between “capped” and “uncapped” environ­
ment. Second, countries’ contributions will not 
have a uniform metric as under Kyoto (absolute 
emissions during a commitment period). In­
stead, the content of contributions was left to 
countries to determine on their own. Based on 
the INDCs so far submitted, countries will have 
absolute emission targets, targets to reduce 
emission intensity compared to GDP, and tar­
gets to reduce emissions compared to busi­
ness-as-usual (BAU). Some contributions are not 
at all based on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
but consist of targets for renewable energy, en­
ergy efficiency, or of individual policies and 
measures. Contributions may also have differ­
ent timeframes, for example, 2025 or 2030.
Hence, the structure of this new regime is very 
different from the Kyoto system.
Against this backdrop, this paper asks what ac­
counting framework is needed to ensure envi­
ronmental integrity is preserved when transfer­
ring units in a post-2020 regime. We will 
address this question by first looking at ac­
counting frameworks more generally: What are 
accounting frameworks and what components 
and functions do they have? To illustrate this, 
the functioning of the accounting framework of 
the Kyoto Protocol will be briefly presented to
then jump into the much more complex post­
2020 accounting world by looking at the In­
tended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs) that have so far been submitted to the 
UNFCCC. On that basis, the paper explores how 
unit transfer could be accounted for in the post­
2020 era and how threats to environmental in­
tegrity, mainly through double counting of 
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2 Accounting Basics
 
2.1 What is an GHG accounting 
framework?  
Accounting is often associated with tracking 
the effort of Parties towards their climate 
change mitigation contributions. However, the 
functioning of an accounting framework does
not start with tracking the individual progress,
nor does it stop there: It is a set of rules and 
procedures that first enables the understanding 
of Parties’ contributions and their expected im­
pact on global GHG levels while then allowing 
for tracking the Parties’ efforts towards meeting 
their contributions in the target period. On that 
basis, estimates on the progress towards meet­
ing the agreed global goal of limiting warming 
to below 2° Celsius can be made. Hence, an ac­
counting framework is a tool for both, ex-ante 
estimation and ex-post tracking. Figure 1 illus­
trates the key elements of a GHG accounting 
framework related to both of these aspects.
Parties’ mitigation contributions are at the 
centre of the ex-ante emissions accounting 
framework. Contributions can have very differ­
ent forms, not only in terms of the individual
level of GHG reductions they try to achieve. In
order to calculate allowable emissions, infor­
mation on several aspects is needed (Hood,
Briner, and Rocha 2014; Levin et al. 2015; Prag, 
Hood, and Barata 2013; Schneider, Kollmuss,
and Lazarus 2014).
•	 The timeframe of the contribution is 
the period in which the contribution is
to be achieved. It can be a single year or 
multiple years (another possibility is 
peak and decline).
•	 The sectoral scope defines the sectors 
covered.
•	 The coverage of GHGs defines which 
Figure 1: Elements of an accounting framework (own illustration based on: Hood / Briner / Rocha 2014; Levin et al. 2015; 
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greenhouse gases are covered by the 
contribution.
•	  The geographic area defines the area 
covered.
•	 The level of the contribution is the 
quantity of emissions and removals the 
Party is to achieve. The value can be ex­
pressed as a single value or a range of 
values. 
•	 Reference level relates to the quantity 
of emissions against which the contri­
bution is tracked. The choice of the ref­
erence level depends on the contribu­
tion type. It can be base year emissions, 
base year emissions intensity or base­
line scenario emissions.
The first four categories define the scope of the 
Party’s contribution (Schneider, Kollmuss, and 
Lazarus 2014), while the latter two establish its 
level of ambition. To allow for ex-post tracking, 
the accounting framework includes three addi­
tional elements:
•	 GHG inventories are a key element of 
the ex-post accounting framework. In­
ventories are currently reported to the 
UNFCCC following specific reporting 
requirements (national communica­
tions + biennial reports for Annex I and 
biennial update reports for non-Annex I
Parties). A post-2020 accounting system
could include common metrics and in­
ventory methodologies (i.e. common 
methodologies for national inventories 
and common global warming potential 
values). The application of these and 
other accounting aspects would need 
to be complemented by respective 
guidelines for measurement, reporting 
and verification (MRV). Accounting and 
MRV are distinct but closely related is­
sues. While MRV refers to the provisions 
for gathering, sharing and reviewing of 
information, accounting establishes 
how this data is used to assess progress 
towards mitigation objectives (Hood,
Briner, and Rocha 2014).
•	 Another element of the accounting 
framework relate to the principles for 
land sector accounting, which define 
how emissions from agriculture and 
forestry are accounted for.
•	 The third element is the principles for 
accounting for internationally trans­
ferable emissions units (Levin et al. 
2015).
It is the latter aspect that we will focus on in this 
paper. Hence, in line with the afore mentioned 
functions of an accounting framework, we will 
look at those accounting elements that en­
hance ex-ante understanding of expected 
transfer of GHG units for the post-2020 period 
and allow to track actual transfer of GHG units
after 2020 ex-post.
2.2 Kyoto Accounting 
2.2.1	 The Definition of Kyoto Commit­
ments: The Assigned Amount 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the above-listed el­
ements to defining commitments are regulated 
as follows. 
•	 Commitment timeframe: Under Art. 3.1 
of the Kyoto Protocol, commitments 
cover multi-year time periods. The time
period that commitments refer to is uni­
form for all Parties. The first commit­
ment period covered the years 2008­
2012, the second commitment period 
covers 2013-2020.
•	 Sectoral scope: Kyoto commitments are 
economy-wide. The sectors to be cov­
ered are listed in Annex A to the Proto­
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culture, and solvent and other product 2.2.2 Changing the Assigned Amount: 
use (land use, land-use change and for- Emission Trading and other Flexibil­




Coverage of GHGs: The GHGs covered
under the KP are listed in Annex A to
the Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO2), me­
thane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydro­
fluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons




Geographical area: The Kyoto commit­
ments cover total national emissions. 
The Kyoto Protocol does not rigidly cap the lev­
el of emissions. Countries’ assigned amounts
are not fixed but may be increased or de­
creased. Annex B Parties have the following op­
tions at their disposal (Sterk and Arens 2010): 
 
• They may generate and trade emission 
reduction units (ERU) among each other 
under the joint implementation (JI) 
mechanism according to Art. 6 of the 
Protocol. The ERUs are deducted from 
the assigned amount of the host coun­
try and added to the assigned amount 
of the buyer country. 
• Commitment level: A country’s com-
mitment under the Kyoto Protocol is to 
ensure that its total aggregate GHG
emissions during the commitment pe­
riod do not exceed a specific absolute 
amount. This amount is referred to as 
“assigned amount”. That is, the as­
signed amount is the total absolute
volume of GHGs that a country is per­
mitted to emit during the commitment 
period. Individual units are referred to 




Reference level: The assigned amount is 
calculated on the basis of the quantified 
emission limitation and reduction
commitments inscribed in Annex B to 
the Protocol. Countries with Kyoto 
commitments are therefore often re­
ferred to as “Annex B Parties”. The 
commitments in Annex B are expressed 
in percentages of countries’ emissions 
in the a specific base year or period. The 
default base year is 1990. For example, 
in the first commitment period the 
countries of the then European Com­
munity committed to reduce their 
emissions to 92% of 1990 levels. Thus, 
the assigned amount of these countries 
for the first commitment period was 
calculated as 5x 92% of 1990 emissions. 
Parties with economies in transition – 
countries from the former communist 
block – were able to choose a different 
base year or period. 
 
• They may purchase certified emission
reductions (CERs) from projects imple­
mented in developing countries under 
the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) according to Art. 12 of the Proto­
col. 
 
• They may generate removal Units
(RMUs) for sinks resulting from human­
induced land use, land-use change and 
forestry (LULUCF) activities on their ter­
ritories. Under Article 3.3 and 3.4 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, Annex B Parties may 
count a limited number of sink activities 
performed on their territory against 
their greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
• They may trade all of the above units 
among each other under Art. 17 of the 
Protocol as long as each retains a mini­
mum number of units, the so-called 
commitment period reserve (CPR). The 
CPR is equal to either 90% of the Party’s 
assigned amount or five times its emis­
sions in the most recent reporting year 
of the commitment period, whichever is 
lower (UNFCCC 2006a, Annex, para 6). 
To manage and track unit transfers, Annex B 
Parties are required to maintain national regis­
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2006b, Annex, Paras 17ff). Each national registry 
contains at least one holding account for the 
respective Party, holding accounts for each le­
gal entity authorised by the Party to participate 
in the mechanisms, cancellation accounts as 
well as a retirement account for each commit­
ment period (UNFCCC 2006b, Annex, Para 21).
A central International Transaction Log (ITL) 
manages and oversees the transfers of units be­
tween countries and each national registry 
must be in agreement with the ITL (UNFCCC 
2006b, Annex, Paras 38ff).
Furthermore, Annex B Parties need to report 
annually on the movements, additions and sub­
traction of units (UNFCCC 2006c).
2.2.3 Emission Accounting 
Annex B Parties are required to establish and 
maintain a “national system” to manage their 
GHG data according to Art. 5 of the Protocol.
They are furthermore required to submit annual 
national greenhouse gas inventories based on 
this national system Art. 7 of the Protocol. The 
inventories are subjected to a technical expert 
review co-ordinated by the UNFCCC Secretariat 
according to Art. 8 of the Protocol and ultimate­
ly entered into a global compilation and ac­
counting database (CAD) (UNFCCC 2006b,
Annex, paras 50ff).
2.2.4 Reporting 
Annex B Parties are required to submit a series 
of reports to allow for proper accounting of 
emissions and Kyoto units:
•	 An initial report, submitted once before 
the start of each commitment period, 
which needs to include the country’s 
yearly GHG data back to its base year or 
period, a calculation of its initial as­
signed amount and commitment peri­
od reserve, and its decisions to what ex­
tent it intends to use LULUCF activities 
under Art. 3.3 and 3.4. It also needs to 
include a description of the national 
system and of the registry (UNFCCC 
2006b, Annex, para 6ff; UNFCCC 
Secretariat 2008).
•	 Annual reports containing information 
on the GHG inventory, LULUCF, chang­
es to the assigned amount, and chang­
es to the national system, and to the 
registry (UNFCCC 2006b, Annex, paras 
17ff). 
•	 Periodic “national communications” ac­
cording to Art. 12 of the Convention 
and Art. 7 of the Protocol containing in­
formation on national circumstances; 
vulnerability to climate impacts; the na­
tional system and registry; policies and 
measures; financial resources and trans­
fer of technology; education, training 
and public awareness (UNFCCC 2006d).
•	 A true-up period report after the end of 
the commitment period. The true-up 
period is a period of 100 days after the 
expert reviews of the GHG inventories 
covering the commitment period have 
been completed. The true-up period 
report has the same contents as the an­
nual reports, and thus provides final in­
formation on the assigned amount 
(UNFCCC 2006b, para 3 and Annex para 
49; UNFCCC 2006d, Annex, para 20;
UNFCCC Secretariat 2008).
2.2.5 Compliance Assessment 
After the end of the commitment period, Par­
ties’ assigned amounts are adjusted to the 
transfers they made. Units acquired from an­
other Party are added to the acquiring Party’s
assigned amount while units transferred to an­
other Party are subtracted from the transferring 
Party’s assigned amount. To comply with their 
Kyoto commitments, Annex B Parties transfer 
units to the retirement account within their re­
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Party is in compliance with its Kyoto commit­
ment, the number of units in the retirement ac­
count is compared to the Party’s actual emis­
sions during the commitment period, as 
accounted for in its annual inventories. 
If a Party has more units than its needs to cover 
all of its emissions, it can transfer any AAUs it
has to the following commitment period. It can 
also transfer CERs and ERUs up to 2.5% of its as­
signed amount respectively (UNFCCC 2006b,
Annex, paras 15f).
Figure 2: Overview of Kyoto Protocol Accounting and Compliance (Source: UNFCCC Secretariat 2008, 21)
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3 Broad Variety of INDC 

Types
Having established the functioning of the ac­
counting framework of the Kyoto Protocol, this
section will jump into the post-2020 accounting 
world, which will presumably be much more 
complex due to the lack of a uniform metric 
and a mandatory guidance on how Parties are 
to design their national contributions. In the fol­
lowing, we will therefore illustrate the diversity 
resulting from the open structure of the post­
2020 process by surveying and categorising the 
INDCs that have been submitted to the UN­
FCCC. The INDCs effectively define the task that 
will need to be achieved by the new agree­
ment’s accounting framework.
At the time of writing, 160 INDCs had been 
submitted, representing 187 countries.1 As not­
ed in the introduction, the INDCs do not follow 
a uniform format but display a large variety of 
types of contributions2: 
•	 105 INDCs are GHG emission targets,
•	 20 are combinations of GHG targets and 
non-GHG targets; the non-GHG targets 
are typically afforestation/reforestation, 
renewable energy and energy efficiency 
targets; 
•	 22 are actions only; these are policies 
and measures that countries intend to 
take;
 
1 Submitted INDCs are available online at 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20 
Pages/submissions.aspx
2 The World Resources Institute has provided a synthesis 
of INDCs (WRI 2016). Analysis is based on WRI data. 
•	 8 are combinations of non-GHG targets 
and actions, with the actions typically 
related to the targets; 
•	 2 are non-GHG targets only, both aim­
ing to transition to close to 100% re­
newable energy in the electricity sector.
Of the 105 GHG emission targets, 33 INDCs are 
absolute reductions compared to a base year. 
The use of base years varies:
•	 15 use 1990 as base year. 
•	 1 uses 1994.
•	 1 uses 2000.
•	 8 use 2005 as base year.
•	 1 uses 2006;
•	 6 use 2010.
•	 1 uses 2014.
76 INDCs are reductions compared to a baseline 
scenario.
Five INDCs are fixed level targets, stipulating a 
fixed amount of emissions in the target year or 
target period. 
Seven INDCs are emission intensity targets, of 
which two have combined intensity targets 
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4 Accounting for unit trans-
fer post-2020
The fact that there is no mandatory guidance 
on how national contributions are to be de­
signed poses significant challenges for the ac­
counting framework, in particular if it is to allow 
for the transfer of international units. Units are 
typically allowances issued under cap-and­
trade mechanisms, such as the Kyoto Protocol’s
AAUs, or credits issued under a crediting 
scheme for emission reductions achieved 
against a crediting baseline, such as the CERs 
and ERUs issued under the Kyoto Protocol’s
project-based mechanisms. However, the trans­
fer of mitigation outcomes must not necessarily
be related to market-based mechanisms but 
can also occur via non-market based approach­
es. For the sake of simplicity, however, we will 
in the following use the term units to refer to 
the transfer of mitigation outcomes from both,
market-based and non-market based ap­
proaches. It must be noted that GHG emission 
units are only relevant to UNFCCC accounting if
they are to be transferred from outside the 
boundary of a Party’s contribution and counted 
directly towards the achievement of that con­
tribution. Transfers within the boundaries of a 
Party’s contribution are not relevant to UNFCCC 
accounting. 
The role of the UNFCCC might however not be 
limited to accounting but the international or­
ganisation could also oversee activities that 
generate units to be used for meeting Parties’
contributions. In some cases, such international
oversight will be indispensable to safeguard the 
environmental integrity of the system. For in­
stance, if units are generated outside the scope 
of Parties’ contributions, there would be no in­
centive for Parties to ensure the additionality of 
the underlying activities, since exported units 
would not be counted against their contribu­
tion. Therefore, the additionality of the activi­
ties would have to be determined by an inter­
national body. More generally, however,
international oversight might also be required 
for units generated within the scope of Parties’ 
contribution if the additionality of the underly­
ing mitigation activities is not ensured by a high 
ambition of Parties’ contributions: If a contribu­
tion is built on an “inflated baseline” and the 
Party has been provided with a surplus of emis­
sion allowances, the Party could be prone to 
use part of its allowances to allow for a non­
additional activity to generate credits, thus cre­
ating “hot air”. This risk could be significantly 
reduced with international oversight. However, 
as the focus of this analysis is on accounting,
details on how international oversight should 
be designed are beyond the scope of this pa­
per.
4.1 What kind of units might be 
traded and how could trans­
fers look like post-2020? 
There are three possible transfers (Hood,
Briner, and Rocha 2014):
1.	 International transfer from one country 
to another;
2.	 Transfer of domestic units from a sector 
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agriculture) to a sector that is covered 
by the contribution (e.g. energy);
3.	 Transfer from one time period to an­
other.
The units transferred can stem from domestic 
or from international systems and can be trans­
ferred domestically or internationally (Prag,
Hood, and Barata 2013, 21).
The best known examples are the transfer of 
units issued by international bodies, namely the 
UNFCCC under the Kyoto Protocol (see above).
There is less, however growing, experience with 
the transfer of units issued by domestic bodies.
These domestic allowances and credits might 
be transferred at the international as well as at 
the domestic level. An example for domestic 
credits transferred internationally are credits 
from Japan’s Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM),
while the linkage between Quebec’s and Cali­
fornia’s  ETSs allows for the international trans­
fer of domestic allowances. With its possibility 
to use offset credits from (urban) forestry pro­
jects and other types of projects, California also 
exemplifies the use domestic offset credits that 
are transferred domestically. 
4.2 Double counting as a key 
risk associated with unit 
transfers 
One of the key issues associated with the trans­
fer of units is the risk of double counting of 
units. Following Schneider et al. (2014), we de­
fine double counting as follows: “Double count­
ing occurs when a single GHG emission reduc­
tion or removal, achieved through a mechanism
issuing units, is counted more than once to­
wards attaining mitigation pledges or financial
pledges for the purpose of mitigating climate 
change” (Schneider, Kollmuss, and Lazarus 
2014). There are several forms of double count­
ing: Double issuance (1) refers to the situation 
where more than one unit is issued for the 
same emissions reduction. Double claiming (2)
is when the same emission reduction is ac­
counted twice against mitigation pledges: By 
the country where the reductions occur and by 
the country using the unit issued for that reduc­
tion. Double use (3), also referred to as double 
selling, occurs when one unit is used to meet 
multiple obligations. Double purpose (4) refers 
to the situation where one unit is used for at­
taining a mitigation pledge but the financial or 
technology transfer related to that unit are 
counted towards financial or technology 
pledges (Schneider, Kollmuss, and Lazarus 
2014). Double coverage (5) refers to the situa­
tion when one emission reduction is used to 
meet a GHG target in one country and a non-
GHG target in another (Hood et al. 2014).
Not all types of double counting are directly re­
lated to accounting provisions. Double issu­
ance, for instance, must be addressed through a 
robust design of the mechanisms involved 
(Schneider, Kollmuss, and Lazarus 2014), while 
robust registry systems are important to avoid 
double selling or retirement of units (Hood, 
Briner, and Rocha 2014). However, accounting 
is key to address double claiming while poten­
tially also assisting in addressing double cover­
age. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, double claiming is 
not possible for Annex I parties with Kyoto tar­
gets, since any emission unit transferred is di­
rectly deducted from the sellers account to the 
buyers account via the International Transac­
tion Log (ITL). Under the CDM, however, there is 
already some form of double claiming: While 
the emission reduction units (CERs) from a CDM
project can only be counted against the Kyoto 
target of an Annex I country, the emission re­
ductions resulting from the project can be 
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tion pledge under the Convention (Prag, Hood,
and Barata 2013).
4.3 Accounting Options to Ad­
dress Double Counting 
In the following, different approaches of deal­
ing with double counting will be presented. 
The analysis is limited to approaches that deal 
with double counting in the context of ac­
counting. Other relevant areas,  which are also 
indispensable for addressing double counting,
such as the design of robust governance ar­
rangements and tracking systems, will not be
explored further.
There are various possibilities to address the 
double counting risks described above. The 
choice depends on the objectives pursued. This 
is related to the two key functions an account­
ing system can have, as outlined above: The ac­
counting system can limit itself to providing ex-
post certainty on the units used or it can en­
hance clarity on the expected use of units ex-
ante as well as during the timeframe in which 
the target is to be achieved. In this context, it is 
key to understand the difference between ac­
counting and reporting. Reporting and ac­
counting are distinct but overlapping issues.
While reporting in this context relates to 
providing information on how units have been 
issued, transferred and used, the accounting 
framework establishes rules on how these activ­
ities are to be counted towards the achieve­
ment of contributions. 
In any case, reporting of unit flows should be 
maintained separately to inventory reporting 
because – depending on the data and method­
ologies used – some inventories may not be ac­
curate enough to attribute particular emission 
reductions to specific interventions. Further, in
order to safeguard the environmental integrity 
of the international system, it is important that 
unit flows are reported by both parties involved 
in the transfer, in the case of market-based 
transfers buyers and sellers (Prag, Hood, and 
Barata 2013). In the following we will briefly 
present different options for dealing with dou­
ble counting.
4.3.1	 Net Unit Flow Reporting 
If the primary goal is to understand the impact 
resulting from the contributions ex-post, in­
formation on actual net flows of units is needed 
from all parties involved. Parties would have to 
report on issuance, retirement, transfers and 
banking of units. This would ensure that the 
aggregate global reductions can be accurately 
calculated ex-post. As highlighted by Hood et 
al. (2014) this approach does not necessarily
mean that the information would be tallied
against the individual contributions, since Par­
ties would not be required to account for the 
transfers of units but only to report the infor­
mation on the flows of units.  Hence, there still 
could be double claiming of mitigation by buy­
ers and sellers, leading to significant uncertain­
ty ex ante on the total emission reductions that 
can be expected (Hood, Briner, and Rocha 
2014).
4.3.2	 Reporting with Increased Ex-Ante 
Certainty 
a) Estimation of Unit Flows 
If greater certainty on ex-ante estimates of 
emission reductions is desired, the require­
ment to report the transfer of units ex-post 
must be complemented by introducing addi­
tional provisions. In such case, all parties would 
be required to provide estimates of the ex­
pected unit flows. This would increase under­
standing on future flows of units, allowing a 
better estimate on the aggregate total of inven­
tory emissions, target emissions levels and 
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flows might significantly deviate from these es­
timates (Hood, Briner, and Rocha 2014).
b) Quantity Limit 
To further increase ex-ante certainty, parties 
could agree on a maximum use of units from 
jurisdictions that are not willing to account for 
the transfer of units. This would allow for a bet­
ter understanding of the aggregate emission 
reductions ex-ante and reduce (not eliminate) 
double claiming (Hood, Briner, and Rocha 
2014).
4.3.3	 Accounting of Units Towards Miti­
gation Contributions 
Finally, parties could agree that use of units is
only possible if both Parties do fully account for 
the transfer of units. This would fully prevent 
double claiming (Schneider, Kollmuss, and Laz­
arus 2014). However, a key prerequisite for this
approach is to clearly define the scope of the 
contribution as described above, in terms of 
their temporal, geographic, GHG and sectoral
dimensions.
Schneider et al. (2014) draw on double entry 
book keeping to illustrate three options for ac­
counting of units. This logically differentiates 
between debit and credit, with debit corre­
sponding to the actual GHG emissions and ad­
ditional reduction obligations of the country 
and credit reflecting the country’s entitlement 
to emit GHGs. Schneider et al. (2014) explore 
three options: (A) accounting for net flows of 
units, (B) restriction on the issuance of units and 
(C) restriction on the use of units.
a) Accounting for Net Flows of Units 
This is the most straightforward approach for 
dealing with the international transfer of emis­
sion units. It requires selling countries to add 
the unit sold as a debit while the country using 
the unit adds it as a credit to its account. Do­
mestic units that fall within the scope of the 
contribution and are transferred internationally, 
such as ETS allowances of linked systems, must 
also be added as debits, while internationally 
transferred domestic units generated outside 
the scope of the contribution must not be ac­
counted but only reported.
b) Restriction on the Issuance of Units 
Under this option countries would not be al­
lowed to issue units eligible for UNFCCC ac­
counting if the emission reductions fall within
the scope of their contribution. While countries 
would still be allowed to issue these units in the 
context of their domestic policies (e.g. ETS) the­
se units cannot be used in the context of UN­
FCCC accounting.
c) Restriction on the Use of Units
Similarly, this option does only allow the use of 
units issued for emission reductions generated 
outside the scope of the contribution to be 
used for UNFCCC accounting.
As highlighted by Schneider et al. (2014) in or­
der to effectively prevent double claiming all
parties would have to agree on the same ap­
proach. The main difference between the three 
approaches 3a) to 3c) relates to the treatment 
of units issued for domestic emission reduc­
tions that fall within the scope of the contribu­
tion. Approach 3a) “Accounting for net flows of 
units” is the only one allowing easy linking of 
ETS because it reflects the transferred allow­
ances as credits and debits in the UNFCCC con­
tributions. Since it is at the same time the most 
simple approach of the three, Schneider et al.
(2014) suggest to use this approach for post­
2020 accounting.
4.4 Diversity of INDCs and Par­
ticipation in Unit Transfer 
In a recent report, Obergassel and Gornik ana­















Nicolas Kreibich and Wolfgang Obergassel
regarding the question to what extend they en­
visage the use of market mechanisms. The 
analysis shows that of the 147 Parties that have 
submitted INDCs, 86 are planning or consider­
ing the use of international market mecha­
nisms. However, the vast majority of these Par­
ties intend to participate as sellers, while only 
13 consider purchasing units. In addition, five 
Parties intend to use domestic markets, while 
seven Parties have expressed interest in using 
both, domestic and international markets
(Obergassel and Gornik 2015).
The contributions of these Parties do not only 
display diverse levels of ambition but they also 
differ significantly in terms of some of the ele­
ments that characterise the contribution 
(timeframe, sectoral scope, reference level). 
Furthermore, some Parties interested in using 
international markets (such as Samoa) submit­
ted an INDC defined as a non-GHG target.
Against the backdrop of the large diversity of 
contributions discussed in section 3, we will in
the following look at the challenges associated 
with the participation of Parties with different 
kinds of contributions in the international trans­
fer of units. The authors explore different ways 
of dealing with these challenges in order to 
identify the opt-in provisions for Parties willing
to participate in the transfer of units that should 
be established. In this context, opt-in provisions 
relate to specific requirements Parties with a 
particular type of INDC must fulfil in order to be 
able to participate in units transfer. These provi­
sions vary depending on the contribution’s 
compatibility with the transfers of emissions
units.
4.4.1 Parties With Multi-Year Targets 
In terms of accounting, the participation of Par­
ties that have put forward a multi-year contri­
bution with absolute GHG reductions com­
pared to a base year is relatively straight 
forward thanks to the experiences made under 
the Kyoto Protocol. The GHG emission reduc­
tions target can be translated into a carbon 
budget for the entire period covered by the 
contribution. Such a procedure is explicitly con­
tained in Norway’s INDC, who commits to a 
GHG emissions reduction of 40% by 2030 com­
pared to 1990 levels (Norway 2015). Under this
carbon budget approach, exported units can be 
directly discounted from the carbon budget 
while those imported are added to the account, 
thereby maintaining environmental integrity. 
As outlined above, there could be a risk to envi­
ronmental integrity in form of double claiming 
when two Parties with quantified GHG contri­
butions transfer units between each other and 
one country accounts for the transferred units 
while the other only expresses its contribution 
in the form of information on its inventory 
emissions, that is, the actual emission reduc­
tions (Hood, Briner, and Rocha 2014). With a 
common accounting framework, however, this
risk can be addressed. No further opt-in provi­
sions for Parties with continuous multi-year tar­
gets willing to participate in unit transfer are 
needed.
In addition, Parties that have adopted multi­
year targets that are not economy-wide or 
which do not relate to the entire national geo­
graphic area could export credits generated 
outside the scope of their contribution. Since 
such exports would not be accounted against 
the exporting Party’s contribution, there is no 
incentive for the Party to ensure the additionali­
ty of the mitigation activity. Therefore, genera­
tion of credits from activities outside the scope 
















 Export Import (Use)  
Credits Yes: 
Exported units generated from activities within the 
scope of the contribution must be fully accounted 
for.  
Exported units from activities outside the scope 
must be reported and subject to international 
oversight. 
 
Yes (common accounting framework needed) 
Allowances Yes: 
Exported units generated from activities within the 
scope of the contribution must be fully accounted 
for.  
Exported units from activities out-side the scope 
must be reported and subject to international 
oversight. 
Yes (common accounting framework needed) 
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Table 1: Parties with Multi-Year Targets: Options to Participate in Unit Transfer 
4.4.2 Parties With Single-Year Targets 
In contrast to unit transfers among Parties with 
multi-year targets, ensuring environmental in­
tegrity is much more challenging if Parties with 
single-year targets participate in the transfer of 
units. More generally, single-year targets pro­
vide less certainty in terms of total GHGs emit­
ted. This is related to the functioning of climate 
change as such, which is caused by the built-up 
of emissions over time. What matters most in 
terms of climate change are cumulative emis­
sions, not the GHGs that are emitted at a specif­
ic point in time. Therefore, the emissions level a 
country has in a specific year does not neces­
sarily provide an adequate picture of its impact 
on the global climate. Since emissions are influ­
enced by changes of parameters such as climat­
ic conditions (rise of emissions due to cold win­
ter) or economy (low emissions in times of 
economic downturn), observing the evolution 
of emissions over several years is much more 
representative than using data from a single 
year. Accordingly, multi-year targets that re­
quire a reduction of cumulative emissions over 
a continuous period of time provide more cer­
tainty on the overall emissions level outcome
than single-year targets, which only require a 
reduction of the emissions level to the agreed 
target in the target year without determining 
emission levels for the years preceding the tar­
get year (Lazarus, Kollmuss, and Schneider 
2014; Prag, Hood, and Barata 2013).
This uncertainty over total emissions may be 
further exacerbated if Parties with single-year 
targets participate in the transfer of GHG units.
This holds for the import and use of GHG units
as well as for the export of units. 
The export of units from countries with single­
year targets is particularly challenging if the 
units are from vintages not covered by its con­
tribution. If a Party with a multi-year contribu­
tion transfers one unit from a specific year cov­
ered by its contribution to another Party, the 
transfer will be deducted from its emissions
budget, its cumulative contribution will there­
fore be made stricter by the amount transferred 
(see above). However, if the unit is transferred 
from a Party with a single year contribution,
there are no clear accounting rules for units 
transferred in a year not covered by the contri­
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Moreover, as exports of reductions from years 
not covered by the contribution are not ac­
counted against the contribution, the exporting 
country has no incentive to ensure the addi­
tionality of the reductions (see above). Hence,
without international oversight, Parties with 
single-year targets should only be allowed to 
export units from within the scope of their con­
tribution if these units were generated in the 
target year vintage.
With international oversight, Parties with sin­
gle-year targets might also be able to export 
credits from mitigation activities outside the 
scope of their contribution. A sector-by-sector 
approach could be applied and the Party de­
cides which sectors can be used for crediting 
and which will be used for domestic mitigation 
(Nylander 2015).
For those sectors covered by the contribution,
crediting could also be allowed for mitigation 
actions in the target year that are below a certain 
threshold for that sector. With this approach, 
crediting cannot jeopardise the achievement of 
the contribution because the credits are either 
from sectors beyond the scope of the contribu­
tion or the credits stem from activities beyond 
the target (threshold) in the specific sector 
(Nylander 2015).
Parties could also be allowed to export units 
from years preceding the target year if addition­
ality of the underlying mitigation activities is
ensured through international oversight.
Hence, it must be ensured that the credited ac­
tivities are not providing a basis or pathway for 
meeting the contribution.
As for imports by countries with single-year 
targets, until now, there is no experience with 
the use of units to meet single-year targets. All
domestic and regional emissions trading 
schemes feature multi-year targets (Lazarus,
Kollmuss, and Schneider 2014). The same holds 
for the Kyoto Protocol. As shown by Prag et al.
(2013), accounting for units against single-year 
targets can be problematic. They demonstrate 
that one Party with the same assumed emis­
sions trajectory would have to purchase a larger 
number of units if its target was defined for 
more than one year. Therefore, for a Party with 
a single-year target it would be much easier to 
rely on transferrable units to achieve its contri­
bution, since far fewer units would be needed 
than for a party with a multi-year target. This 
could make comparability of contributions
even more difficult and lead to fewer cumula­
tive emission reductions compared with con­
tinuous multi-year targets (even if partially met 
through imported units) or single-year targets 
fully met through domestic mitigation activities 
(Lazarus, Kollmuss, and Schneider 2014).
Lazarus et al. (2014) discuss different options to 
deal with the challenges associated with the 
use of units for meeting single-year targets. The 
first option discussed coincides with the sug­
gestion of Prag et al. (2013) to allow use of in­
ternational units only if the vintage year of the 
units corresponds to a year covered by a Party’s 
contribution. However, Lazarus et al. (2014) 
show, first, that this restriction would make car­
bon markets less efficient by concentrating 
demand for units from vintages that coincide 
with Parties’ contributions, and second, that it
can also be easily defeated in the case of inter­
nationally transferred allowances: Parties with 
multi-year targets could buy units from other 
vintages to free-up units for sale to Parties with 
single-year targets, thereby undermining the 
regulation. Hence, for this option to function 
appropriately, all Parties would have to adopt 
single-year targets and use the same target year 
(=same timeframe).
According to Lazarus et al. (2014) this option 
would, however, not work as intended in the 
case of internationally transferred allowances,
since allowances that have been freed up for 
the target year might not necessarily reflect ad­












 Export Import (Use)  
Credits Yes: 
Credits from sectors not covered by the contribu-
tion beyond the sectoral threshold and subject to 
international oversight.  
Exported credits from sectors covered by the con-
tribution must be fully accounted for if they are 
generated in the target year vintage. If they are 
generated in years preceding the target year, inter-
national oversight must ensure additionality of un-
derlying mitigation actions.  
Yes:  
If all Parties use same timeframe (single-year target 
with same target year), import and use is possible. 
No: 
If selling Parties have multi-year targets or single year-
targets with different target years, a conversion of the 
single-year target into a multi-year target is required. 
 
Allowances Yes: 
Exported allowances must be from the target year 
vintage and must be fully accounted for. 
Exported units from activities out-side the scope 
must be reported and subject to international 
oversight. 
If all Parties use same timeframe (single-year target 
with same target year), import and use is possible. 
No: 
If selling Parties have multi-year targets or single year-
targets with different target years, a conversion of the 
single-year target into a multi-year target is required. 
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They point out that if, for instance, banked al­
lowances from years prior to the target year al­
lowed the seller Party to free up allowances 
which are then sold to another Party for pledge 
attainment, the overall emissions in the target 
year could be higher than without the transfer.
However, this is a general feature of banking, 
not of the single target year. Use of banked 
units in a given year will in any case lead to 
emissions in that year being higher than if there 
was no banking. The question is therefore ra­
ther whether banking should be allowed or not.
The enhanced flexibility provided by banking is 
generally viewed positively if the banked sur­
plus results from actual emission reductions,
but if the surplus results from over-allocation, 
banking makes it difficult to eliminate such “hot 
air”. 
Lazarus et al. further argue that with the option 
of everyone adopting single-year targets, Par­
ties would still be able to meet their contribu­
tions largely through the purchase of units.
They therefore propose a second option (which 
could be combined with the first option) con­
sisting in limiting the fraction of a Party’s con­
tribution that can be met with units. This would 
reduce the impact of the issues identified. In 
our view, however, the risk of Parties with sin­
gle-year targets meeting their contribution 
largely through use of units from other Parties 
with the same target time-frame is moderate: If 
all Parties involved adopt single-year targets 
with the same target year, the supply of units 
will be limited in number, reducing the proba­
bility of single Parties meeting their contribu­
tions largely by using units from other Parties.
In consequence, Parties with single-year targets 
could be allowed to use units for meeting their 
contribution if all Parties involved also adopt 
single-year targets with the same target year. 
This, however, can be expected to remain a ra­
ther theoretical option as the global climate re­
gime post-Paris is characterised by a large di­
versity of contributions. Hence, a translation of 
the single-year target into a multi-year emis­
sions path would represent the most practical
solution to solve the issues associated with the 
use of units for meeting single-year-targets 
(Lazarus, Kollmuss, and Schneider 2014).








 Export Import (Use)  
Credits Yes: 
Exported units generated from activities within the 
scope of the contribution must be fully accounted 
for.  
Exported units from activities outside the scope 




Exported units generated from activities within the 
scope of the contribution must be fully accounted 
for.  
Exported units from activities outside the scope 
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4.4.3	 Parties With Non-GHG Contribu­
tions 
Countries with non-GHG contributions may also 
be willing to participate in transfers of units. 
One example is Samoa, which has put forward a 
conditional renewable energy target of 100% 
by 2025, and expressed its willingness to sell in­
ternational units. The example of Samoa indi­
cates what the main role of Parties with non-
GHG targets will presumably be: the role of unit 
sellers. The import and use of carbon units for 
achieving a non-carbon contribution is rather a 
theoretical option, since a mechanism to trans­
late the carbon unit into a non-carbon unit to 
fully account for it would be needed.
However, the export of units from a Party with 
a non-GHG contribution entails risks to envi­
ronmental integrity in the form of double cov­
erage. If the unit transferred is generated in sec­
tors covered by the non-GHG contribution, the 
mitigation result might be counted twice: the 
exporting Party could count the achievements 
related to the action on which the transferred 
unit is based against its own non-GHG contribu­
tion (e.g. increased renewable energy capacity),
while the importing Party would use the unit to 
account it against its GHG-based target. Anoth­
er example illustrates the risks associated with
crediting of activities to reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD+): If a country with a forest cover target 
(expressed in hectares of forested area) reduces 
its deforestation and sells the associated REDD+ 
credits to another Party which uses these cred­
its for UNFCCC accounting, then there is a sig­
nificant risk that the emission reductions 
stemming from the REDD+ activity are counted 
twice.  
One option to address these concerns consists 
in limiting the role of Parties with non-GHG 
contributions to only export units from activi­
ties that are outside the sectoral scope of their 
contributions, since would most effectively 
eliminate the risk for double coverage. At the 
same time, however, the possibilities for credit­
ing activities would be drastically reduced.
A second option would be to give the Party the 
possibility to draw the line between activities 
intended to meet the contribution and activi­
ties that can be used for crediting. The possibili­
ties for implementing this differentiation would 
depend on how the non-GHG contribution was 
formulated: If, for instance, a Party commits to 
generating 100% of its energy from renewable 










 Export Import (Use)  
Credits Yes: 
Crediting threshold must be set below intensity 
target.  
Yes (common accounting framework needed) 
Allowances Yes: 
Intensity target needs to be translated to absolute 
figure and adjusted ex-post 
Yes (common accounting framework needed) 
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energy sources, generation of emission units 
from activities that increase its renewable ener­
gy capacities would no longer be possible,
since double coverage would be inevitable.
A Party with a renewable energy target ex­
pressed in absolute terms could be allowed to 
generate units within the scope of its contribu­
tion if it commits to fully account for the units 
sold. For instance, assume a Party has adopted 
a target to increase its renewable energy capac­
ity by 100MW while at the same time, carbon 
credits generated from a renewable power 
plant in that same country are sold to another 
Party which uses these credits to meet its emis­
sion target. In order to maintain environmental 
integrity, the MW installed capacity that was 
used to generate and export emission credits 
must not be counted against the selling coun­
tries’ contribution. For this option to work 
properly, a clear differentiation of the contribu­
tion from creditable activities is needed. 
If a Party has submitted specific policies and
measures as its contribution, these policies and 
measures would need to be accounted for in 
the baseline and additionality determination of 
the activities that are to be credited. 
More broadly, to avoid the results of the mitiga­
tion action to be counted twice, all parties in­
volved should fully report on the transfer of 
units. If this is ensured, then at least the aggre­
gate global emissions can be accurately as­
sessed ex-post. In addition, ex-ante uncertainty 
could be reduced to some extend if countries 
provide information on the estimated flow of 
units (Hood, Briner, and Rocha 2014).
4.4.4	 Parties with Emission Intensity Tar­
gets 
Intensity targets relate the GHG target to an­
other factor, such as GDP or kWh. Using these 
targets as a basis for the transfer of units is diffi­
cult because the actual amount of the coun­
tries’ allowable emissions is difficult to predict.
To allow trading with intensity targets, the in­
tensity target could be transformed to an abso­
lute amount by using projections on the re­
spective output factor (GDP or other). The 
absolute emission amount would need to be 
adapted ex-post on the basis of the actual value 
of the index (GDP or other). While this might be 
a theoretical option to allow for the participa­
tion of Parties with intensity targets, it involves 
a considerable ex-ante uncertainty. 
This uncertainty might significantly reduce the 
attractiveness of units from Parties with intensi­
ty targets. In addition, in order to deal with the 
risk of over-allocation and subsequent over­
selling, additional safeguarding mechanism
may be needed, further increasing transaction 
costs. 
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At first sight, the interest of a Party with an in­
tensity target to import and use units seems 
questionable, since you might expect the Party 
to first translate its intensity target into an abso­
lute GHG target based on projections in order
to then use the imported credits or allowances 
for meeting its projected absolute GHG target.
However, Parties could also proceed much 
more pragmatically: They could first import 
units and then discount the respective amount 
of GHG reductions from their actual emissions 
level. In a next step the net amount of emis­
sions would be put in relation to the factor (e.g.
GDP) on which their intensity target is based. By 
proceeding this way, Parties with emissions in­
tensity targets can also benefit from the import 
and use of internally transferred units. 
In addition, as highlighted by Nylander, intensi­
ty targets might be compatible with the gener­
ation and export of credits, if the crediting
threshold is set below the intensity target 
(Nylander 2015). Since the success in achieving 
the intensity target depends on exogenous fac­
tors, the amount of creditable activities might 
however vary. This can be expected to reduce 
the attractiveness for implementing crediting 
activities. 
4.4.5 Parties With Multiple Contributions 
Some Parties, such as India, have put forward a 
combination of a GHG based goal with non-
GHG targets. Other Parties have adopted a con­
tribution with a combination of different non- 
GHG targets. These multiple contributions can 
have a mutually reinforcing effect and provide 
more certainty for reaching the goal than a 
GHG goal only. However, they can also be more 
challenging in terms of accounting, first to 
avoid double counting, and second to estimate 
future emissions levels. 
Parties that have adopted multiple non-GHG 
contributions would have to convert these con­
tributions into a GHG-based goal if they do not 
only want to participate in crediting but also in
trading of allowances. In general terms, howev­
er, Parties with non-GHG contributions can be 
expected to mainly be interested in exporting 
of credits, since import and use of external units 
would require translating non-GHG contribu­
tions to a GHG-target. Here, the situation is 
similar to those countries that have adopted 
one non-GHG contribution only (see section 
4.4.3 above). 
If Parties with contributions combining a GHG­
goal and non-GHG targets intend to participate
in trading of allowances, the GHG-contribution 
could be used to allocate the total amount of 
allowances.   
However, it seems evident that Parties that 
have put forward multiple non-GHG goals such 
as renewable energy or energy efficiency tar­
gets in addition to their GHG goal are primarily
interested in domestic actions. Import and use 
of units could, nonetheless, be of interest as a 
supplementary tool for ensuring the GHG goal
is met.  
As for crediting, the Party could define activities 
that are beyond the scope of the contribution.
Another possibility would be to generate trans­
ferable units within the scope of the contribu­
tion. Exporting these units would require sepa­
rate accounting of each target. For instance,
assume a Party adopted a multiple contribution 
consisting of a GHG-goal and a renewable en­
ergy target. In that same country, a new in­
stalled renewable energy power plant is to 
generate credits that are to be sold internation­
ally. In order to ensure environmental integrity, 
the exporting Party will have to account for the 
installed capacity of that power plant. At the 
same time, the GHG emissions mitigated will 
have to be accounted towards the GHG target.
However, there might be cases of multiple con­
tributions where such allocation might not be 
as straight forward, in particular if multiple non­
 
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Exported units from activities outside the scope 
must be reported and subject to international 
oversight. 
 
Exported units generated from activities within the 
scope of the contribution must be accounted for all 
goals concerned. 
Yes: 
Parties with a combination of GHG goal and non-GHG 
contributions could use GHG goal for accounting 
(common accounting framework needed) 
 
n.a. to Parties with multiple contributions consisting of 
non-GHG goals. 
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GHG targets are linked and possibly combined 
with individual actions.
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5 Conclusions
 
The structure of the new climate regime build­
ing on the Paris Agreement will be very differ­
ent from the Kyoto Protocol’s. Truly global in
reach, the Paris Agreement allows Parties to au­
tonomously define their individual contribu­
tions to limit the increase of the global mean 
temperature to 2° Celsius compared to pre­
industrial levels. The open structure of the 
agreement can be expected to serve different 
goals by increasing the participation of Parties,
allowing for more creativity when determining 
the contributions and providing a basis for mu­
tually reinforcing (non-GHG) targets. However,
the large diversity of contributions resulting 
from this open process also leads to significant 
accounting challenges, in particular given the 
fact that the future regime will allow for the 
transfer of GHG emissions units among Parties.
Hence, a balance must be struck between al­
lowing for large participation of Parties on the 
one hand and ensuring environmental integrity 
and reduce ex-ante uncertainty on the other. 
The analysis has shown that unit transfers of 
Parties with different types of contributions are 
associated with different levels of risks for dou­
ble counting. Hence, participation of Parties 
whose contribution is expressed as a continu­
ous multi-year GHG target is fairly straight­
forward. Multi-year targets are compatible with 
a carbon budget approach that can be used to 
directly account for the units transferred. In or­
der to reduce the risk of double claiming and 
increase ex-ante certainty, Parties should be re­
quired to fully account for net unit flows of 
units.
Single-year targets, in contrast, are less com­
patible with the transfer of mitigation results:
Both the import (use) and the export of allow­
ances could undermine the environmental in­
tegrity of the entire system, the same holds for 
the use of credits. Hence, to allow the participa­
tion of Parties with single-year targets in these 
activities, a conversion into a continuous multi­
year target is needed. Without such conversion,
the export and particularly the use of units 
would need to be tied to very strict precondi­
tions, significantly limiting the practicability of
these transfers. 
Contributions expressed in terms of non-GHG 
targets and contributions with multiple non-
GHG targets are also associated with signifi­
cant risks of double counting. While the import 
and use of emission units by these countries is
rather unlikely since this would require a con­
version of the carbon unit into the metric of the 
respective non-GHG target, the export of units
could be envisaged by several countries. Here,
the main risk is double coverage. To address 
this specific double counting risk countries 
could limit themselves to selling credits from
units outside the scope of the contribution. If
units (credits or allowances) from within the 
scope of the contribution are also to be export­
ed, all units transferred should be fully account­
ed against the non GHG-contribution(s). How­
ever, there might be non-GHG contributions 
where this can be challenging.
Parties with multiple contributions that com­
bine a GHG target with non-GHG targets can 
import GHG units and account them for the 
GHG target. Exported units from within the 
scope of the contribution, however, would have 
to be fully accounted against the GHG targets 








































Carbon Markets after Paris – How to Account for the Transfer of Mitigation Results? 
In general terms, contributions expressed as in­
tensity targets are less compatible with allow­
ance trading approaches. Since the total
amount of allowances a Party would be allocat­
ed would depend on dynamic factors, projec­
tions on the evolution of these factors would be 
needed ex-ante while the actual amount of al­
lowances would then have to be adjusted ex-
post. Under these circumstances, trading is
much more susceptible to the risks of specula­
tion and over-selling. By contrast, import and
use of units as well as crediting of activities 
might be possible, with a crediting threshold 
set below the intensity targets. 
In addition to these opt-in requirements for 
Parties willing to participate in unit transfers 
and regardless of the type of contribution in
question, the scope of the contribution must be 
properly defined. In addition, there are some 
general possibilities to minimize, reduce or
avoid different forms of double counting: If 
the primary goal is to ensure environmental in­
tegrity ex-post, Parties involved would at least 
have to report on net unit transfers. As shown,
this option would, however, not address the 
risk of double claiming ex-ante. Given the ur­
gent need to act on climate change and in­
crease mitigation ambition, the risk of double 
claiming should not be underestimated. The 
consequences of further delaying climate ac­
tion due to double claiming can be expected to 
be disastrous, increasing the costs of mitigating 
climate change and bringing us nearer to the 
climatic tipping points. Hence, increasing ex-
ante certainty is key for properly addressing 
climate change. To maintain environmental in­
tegrity and increase ex-ante certainty, Parties 
should be required to fully account for export­
ed units generated from mitigation activities 
inside the scope of their contribution, while
transfers of units generated outside the scope 
of the contributions must be reported and 
should be subject to international oversight.
Moreover, international oversight might be re­
quired for all types of unit transfers if addition­
ality of underlying mitigation activities is not 
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